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1 Introduction
David Lewis, famously, suggested a certain kind of picture of what the world is like.
He called that picture Humean supervenience, and described it as follows:
Humean Supervenience [. . . ] says that in a world like ours, the fundamen-
tal relations are exactly the spatiotemporal relations: distance relations,
both spacelike and timelike, and perhaps also occupancy relations between
point-sized things and spacetime points. And it says that in a world like
ours, the fundamental properties are local qualities: perfectly natural in-
trinsic properties of points, or of point-sized occupants of points. Therefore
it says that all else supervenes on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local
qualities throughout all of history, past and present and future.1
However, there is a concern that Humean Supervenience is inconsistent with our best
physical theories.2 More specically, there is a concern that the kind of world de-
scribed by Lewis above—one which is fully and exhaustively characterised by the as-
signment of intrinsic qualities to points of spacetime—could not be a world described
by quantum mechanics.3 More specically still, the concern is that the characteristic
quantum-mechanical phenomenon of entanglement rules out the possibility of giving
1[Lewis, 1994, p. 474]
2[Teller, 1986], [Maudlin, 2007]
3To be strictly accurate, there are good reasons for thinking that Humean supervenience, at least on
the letter of the above, is inconsistent with classical physics. However, one can get around this by
(roughly speaking) taking “local qualities” to be intrinsic properties of innitesimally small space-
time regions, rather than spacetime points per se (see [Buttereld, 2006]). I will ignore this subtlety
for the purposes of this essay.
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an exhaustive description of the world by describing it point-by-point. So (according
to these arguments), insofar as we take quantum mechanics to be true (i.e., insofar
as we take the actual world to be accurately described by quantum mechanics), we
should not take Humean Supervenience to be true either.
More recently, however, there has been a ghtback on behalf of Humean Superve-
nience: it has been argued that, at least if one is a Bohmian about quantummechanics,4
then Humean Supervenience remains a consistent option after all. This paper seeks to
resist this most recent defence of Humean Supervenience. First, I introduce the rele-
vant pieces of Bohmianmechanics, and indicate the prima facie tension between entan-
glement and Humean Supervenience. Second, I discuss the argument that Bohmian
Humeans (from here on out, “Bohumeans”)make to render their ontology compatible
with Humean Supervenience. This argument rests upon a particular claim: namely,
that the wavefunction may be regarded as a Humean summary of the positions of
the Bohmian particles over time. I then argue that we can have no good reason to
think that this “summarising” claim is true. I conclude with some remarks about the
relationship between locality requirements and scientic evidence.
Before I start, I want to clarify that this paper is not about whether some suitably
modied version of Humean Supervenience is compatible with quantum mechanics.
For instance, Loewer and Albert have observed that quantum mechanics, standardly
formulated, is straightforwardly compatible with the requirement that qualities be lo-
cal in conguration space, rather than physical space;5 whilst Darby has argued that we
can preserve the “spirit” of Lewis’ proposal by allowing that there are fundamental
relations besides the spatiotemporal relations.6 All three note that doing so is consis-
tent with Lewis’ broader Humean goal of recovering all else (all mental and nomo-
logical facts, in particular) from the categorical world, i.e., from a particular distri-
bution of non-modal properties and relations. This is all well and good, but not my
concern here. I am exclusively attending to the question of whether the specic va-
riety of Humean Supervenience defended by Lewis (that requiring the locality of all
fundamental properties in physical space) can be rendered consistent with quantum
mechanics.
4[Esfeld, 2014] claims that the proposed rescue of Humean Supervenience is available to any
“primitive-ontology” approach to quantum mechanics, not just Bohmian mechanics. It’s not my
intention to examine this claim in this essay: in the interests of brevity, I will focus on the specic
case of Bohmianism (though see fn. 13).
5See e.g. [Loewer, 1996], [Albert, 1996].
6[Darby, 2012]
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2 Entanglement in Bohmian mechanics
The fundamental entities of Bohmian mechanics are the particles: pointlike objects,
which have denite positions at all times, and which are held to be the fundamental
constituents ofmacroscropicmatter.7 Thus, if we haveN particles, then their collective
state at any given time may be represented by an N -tuple (Q1, . . . , QN) of points of
X , where X is the space representing physical space—that is, by a single point Q in
the N -fold conguration space XN (the N -fold direct product of X with itself). The
behaviour of the particles is determined by the wavefunction, a function Ψ : XN → C,
via the guidance equation
dQi
dt
=
~
mi
Im
(∇iΨ
Ψ
(Q)
)
(1)
where mi is the mass of the ith particle, and ∇i denotes the gradient associated with
the ith productand of XN . (This is all in the absence of spin: for the purposes of
this essay, we need only consider spinless particles.) The wavefunction itself evolves
according to the usual Schrödinger equation,
i~
dΨ
dt
= HΨ (2)
where H is the Hamiltonian.
The challenge for the aspiring Bohumean may now be stated quite succintly: the
wavefunction cannot be any part of a Humean Supervenience basis, and hence cannot
(for one attracted by Lewis’ picture) be interpreted as a fundamental physical com-
ponent of the world. For, the wavefunction assigns values (complex numbers) to N -
tuples of points of space, not to individual points of space. But the Humean Super-
venience basis was required to include only local qualities, i.e., those comprising the
assignment of intrinsic properties to individual spacetime points (or to point-sized
occupants of spacetime points). So the wavefunction is not the kind of local prop-
erty with which Lewis would be happy, unless there is some way of showing that
any given wavefunction can be reduced to (uniquely specied by) some collection of
suitably local qualities.
Certainly, there are specic circumstances in which such a reduction is possible:
those in which the wavefunction is not entangled. For simplicity, let N = 2; now sup-
7My presentation of Bohmian mechanics here follows that of [Dürr et al., 1992] and
[Dürr and Teufel, 2009].
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pose that the wavefunction Ψ(x1, x2) is a product wavefunction,
Ψ(x1, x2) = ψ1(x1)ψ2(x2) (3)
for some ψ1 : X → C and ψ2 : X → C. Then since
∇1(ψ1ψ2)
ψ1ψ2
=
∇1ψ1
ψ1
(4)
and similarly for particle 2, we nd that the general guidance equation (1) decomposes
into the two individual guidance equations
dQ1
dt
=
~
m1
Im
(∇1ψ1
ψ1
(Q1)
)
(5a)
dQ2
dt
=
~
m2
Im
(∇2ψ2
ψ2
(Q2)
)
(5b)
So in a case such as this, where the joint wavefunction is simply a product of single-
particle wavefunctions, we can make the joint wavefunction Humeanistically accept-
able by regarding it as a “conjunction” of duly local individual wavefunctions.
The problem, though, is that generic wavefunctions are entangled, i.e., are not ex-
pressible as a product of single-particle wavefunctions. Still with N = 2, consider as
an example
Ψ(x1, x2) =
1√
2
(ψ1(x1)ψ2(x2) + ψ
′
1(x1)ψ
′
2(x2)) (6)
where
∫
X
ψ∗1ψ
′
1 dx1 = 0 =
∫
X
ψ∗2ψ
′
2 dx2. The sum (6) cannot be factorised into a single
product, and so we cannot treat it as simply arising from some pair of assignments to
the points of X individually.
The nearest proxies for individual wavefunctions, in a case such as (6), are the con-
ditionalwavefunctions.8 The conditional wavefunction of particle 1, relative to particle
2’s being in location Q2, is given by
ΨQ21 (x1) := Ψ(x1, Q2) (7)
and similarly for the conditional wavefunction of particle 2, relative to particle 1’s be-
ing in locationQ1. More generally, given anN -particle jointwavefunctionΨ(x1, . . . , xN),
ifwe select (say) the rstM < N particles as a subsystem, then the conditional wavefunc-
8The below follows [Dürr and Teufel, 2009, chap. 11].
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tion of that subsystem (relative to the conguration of the remainingN −M particles)
is given by
ΨY1...M(x) := Ψ(x,Y) (8)
where x := (x1, . . . , xM) and Y := (QM+1, . . . , QN). That is, the conditional wave-
function of the subsystem is obtained by “saturating” the joint wavefunction with the
actual locations of the remaining particles.
The importance of the conditional wavefunction is as follows. Suppose that the joint
wavefunction is of the form
Ψ(x,y) = φ(x)ψ(y) + Ψ⊥(x,y) (9)
where y = xM+1, . . . , xN and Ψ⊥ and ψ have macroscopically disjoint y-supports;
moreover, suppose that the actual conguration Y of the environment is in the sup-
port of ψ (so that Ψ⊥(x,Y) = 0 for all x). It then follows that the conditional wave-
function ΨY1,...,M is given by the wavefunction φ—and furthermore, that the guidance
equation for the subsystem’s congurationX := (Q1, . . . , QM) reduces to
dX
dt
=
~
m
Im
(∇xφ
φ
(X)
)
(10)
where m = (m1, . . . ,mM). In such a case, we say that φ is an eective wavefunction
for the subsystem. If the subsystem is suciently decoupled from its environment,
then the eective wavefunction will also abide by Schrödinger’s equation; if there is
interaction, however, then it will not evolve in this unitary fashion.
It is, however, important to note that although the conditional wavefunctions of
the subsystems can be computed from the “universal wavefunction” Ψ and the actual
conguration Q, the reverse is not true: the conditional wavefunctions associated to
subsystems underdetermine the joint wavefunction. For example, in the two-particle
case, one can easily have a distinct pair of joint wavefunctions Ψ(x1, x2) and Φ(x1, x2)
such that Ψ(x1, Q2) = Φ(x1, Q2) and Ψ(Q1, x2) = Φ(Q1, x2): that agreement only re-
quires that they coincide on certain surfaces within conguration space. Moreover, in
the casewhere the subsystem and the environment are coupled to one another, it is not
just that the conditional wavefunction does not evolve according to the Schrödinger
dynamics—in general, therewill not be any autonomous dynamics for the conditional
wavefunction at all.
One more remark. In the above, I have followed orthodoxy by supposing that the
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best way to interpret the wavefunction “ontologically” is as a eld of some sort (i.e., as
assigning properties to points of conguration space). But as [Belot, 2011] points out,
Bohmians have a reasonably natural alternative: that of interpreting the wavefunction
as representing a collective property of the particles. Each possible wavefunction, on
this view, would be a kind of dispositional property which specied, for each possible
conguration of the collective of particles, how the particles would behave if they
found themselves in that conguration. However, this interpretationwould be subject
to the same problem as the more mainstream interpretation in terms of elds: at any
given time, a collective of N particles is an occupant of N spacetime points, not an
occupant of a (single) spacetime point, and so the wavefunction is not the kind of
local property that can be safely admitted into the Humean Supervenience basis.
3 The Humean response
As mentioned in §1, I am not going to consider responses that modify the Lewisian
statement of Humean Supervenience; my interest in this essay is in responses which
preserve the letter as well as the spirit of Humean Supervenience. Doing that requires
that everything in the supervenience basis——everything that comprises the funda-
mental ontology—is local in space and time. As we have just seen, though, the wave-
function is not spatiotemporally local in the required sense. So that leaves only one
option: deny that the wavefunction is part of the supervenience basis.
The natural next question, then, is what the status of the quantum state is on this
picture. If standard Bohmian mechanics is indeed to be recovered, then it had bet-
ter be the case that the wavefunction—like everything else—supervenes upon the
supervenience basis, i.e., upon the motions of the Bohmian particles. We need to
be careful, however, about the exact sense in which this supervenience takes place.
One might have thought that the supervenience thesis had the following form: given
the trajectories of the Bohmian particles, there is a unique wavefunction which could
have brought about those trajectories in a dynamically acceptable way. That is, let
Ψ : T × XN → C be an N -particle wavefunction, and QN : T → XN be a trajectory
through N -particle conguration space, such that Ψ and Q between them solve the
Schrödinger equation (for some specic Hamiltonian H) and the Bohmian guidance
equation. Then (the claim goes) there is no distinct wavefunction Ψ′ : T × XN → C
such thatΨ′ andQ jointly solve the Schrödinger equation (with the sameHamiltonian)
and the Bohmian guidance equation.
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This kind of supervenience is not to be had, at least in general: there are distinct
solutions of the Schrödinger equation which generate the same motions for Bohmian
particles.9 Consider a Bohmian particle in a box: that is, a particle with one positional
degree of freedom, which is conned to the unit interval [0, 1] (but is otherwise free).
Then the energy eigenfunctions of the system are of the form
φn(x) = sin(npix) (11)
for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . . As an eigenfunction, φn evolves under the Schrödinger equation
only into stateswhich are equivalent to φn (up to phase). But by the guidance equation,
dQ/dt = 0 if the wavefunction is φn, or if it is any wavefunction equivalent to φn . So
any pair of such eigenfunctions are associated to the same Bohmian trajectory: namely,
that of the particle remaining at rest. The best that can be hoped for is that cases such
as this are exceptional; this is plausible, but it is not clear how to go about proving it.
However, for our purposes here the question is moot. For even if a positive answer
to this technical question could be found, it is not one which would be desperately
useful to the Humean: for what it would show is that in non-exceptional cases, the
Bohmian trajectories together with the laws of Bohmian mechanics uniquely determine
the wavefunction. And of course, the Humean denies that the laws are to be taken
as part of the supervenience basis. However, this also suggests a natural thing the
Humean might seek to say instead: that the Bohmian trajectories determine both the
quantum dynamics and the wavefunction. This means that the Humean can nesse
the technical question above, by arguing that the wavefunction is determined by the
same “best-system” method used to generate the laws. That is, the claim need not
be that the Bohmian trajectories uniquely x the quantum dynamics and the specic
wavefunction involved in those dynamics: or at least, not in the sense of there being
just one dynamics-plus-wavefunction package which would deliver those trajectories.
Instead, the idea is that of the candidate packages, precisely one will maximise sim-
plicity and strength (under some appropriate weighting); and this package is the one
which the Humean takes to be the correct characterisation of what’s going on.
This is the strategy advocated by a number of recent authors.10 In general, these
authors seem more or less sympathetic to the idea that the supervenience basis be
extremely austere: that it be constituted by nothing other than the Bohmian trajec-
9The below is taken from [Belot, 2011].
10[Miller, 2014], [Bhogal and Perry, 2015], [Callender, 2014], [Esfeld et al., 2014]; [Dickson, 2000] also
pregures some of the relevant ideas.
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tories. Such austerity may not be necessary, however. The Bohumean could include
other data in their supervenience basis, provided only that such data are appropri-
ately local. (The advantage of doing so is that the richer the supervenience basis, the
more plausible it is that the full Bohmian dynamics really will supervene upon it.)
For instance, they could perhaps include such particle properties as mass or charge,
or (total) spin11—provided that such properties are construed as intrinsic properties
of the Bohmian particles, rather than characteristics of the wavefunction.12 They could
even include the conditional wavefunction of each particle (relative to the otherN − 1
particles), although this might need some explanation of why the conditional wave-
functions get to be part of the fundamental ontology but the joint wavefunctions do
not. In order to not prejudge the question of what should or should not go in the
supervenience basis, I will just denote the basis as H .13
So, the picture is as follows. We take as given our supervenience basis H . H cer-
tainly includes the Bohmian trajectories, and may or may not include other local data
(e.g. particle-properties or the conditional wavefunction). In order to specify the best
system, we need to then introduce a new piece of theoretical vocabulary: that of the
wavefunction, Ψ. The Humean should then claim that the best system for codifying
H is one which asserts the following:14
• That Ψ is a complex-valued eld on T ×XN
• That Ψ(0,x) has such-and-such a value at x, for each x ∈ XN
11That is, the spin quantum number of the particles; not the projection of the spin along some axis,
which cannot plausibly be interpreted as a property of the particle rather than the wavefunction
(see e.g. [Dürr and Teufel, 2009, §8.4]).
12Note that doing so is not entirely straightforward: see [Brown et al., 1996].
13[Esfeld, 2014] observes that other primitive ontologies could be used to provide alternative austere
supervenience bases; it’s not so clear that other primitive ontologies are so amenable to forming
the richer bases discussed here, however. For example, if the mass of a particle is to be localised by
being taken as a property of the particle, then the primitive ontology for that particle will have to be
a point-sized occupant of some spatial point (at each time), as is the case in Bohmian mechanics. In
GRWmorGRWf, by contrast, the primitive ontology of the particle is either a region-sized occupant,
or else a point-sized occupant of multiple spatial points at each time (and in the case of ashes,
sometimes an occupant of no point)—so treatingmass as a property of a particle with that primitive
ontology would not mean that mass was a local quality.
14[Bhogal and Perry, 2015] use a best system which postulates a space Q (with the structure of XN )
and a particle ω moving around within Q (whose location at any time is exactly correlated with
the conguration of the N particles); the wavefunction is then postulated as a function assigning a
complex number to each point of Q, which then acts on ω via the guidance equation. If Q here is
intended to simply be dened asXN (i.e., as the space consisting ofN -tuples of points ofX), then I
take these systems to be essentially the same. If not—that is, if the idea is to stipulate Q’s structure
separately and then put it into appropriate correspondence with N -tuples of points of X—then it
seems to me that the system outlined here will be considerably simpler, at no cost in strength.
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• That Ψ satises the Schrödinger equation
• That the location of each particle, together with Ψ, satises the Bohmian guid-
ance equation
Let us refer to this best system package as B.
[Esfeld et al., 2014], [Miller, 2014] and [Callender, 2014] don’t characterise their po-
sition as involving a non-standard form of Humeanism. For these authors, it remains
the case that only the nomological facts arise from a best-systems analysis; so for them,
making this Humean move requires treating the wavefunction as nomological rather
than ontological. Although they recognise that this treatment of the wavefunction
may require some revision of our usual conception of laws,15 I think that the more sig-
nicant novelty is that we are utilising a best systemwhose vocabulary is not conned
to terms referring to individuals and properties in the supervenience basis.16 Bhogal
and Perry, however, do discuss this departure from more standard presentations of
Humeanism:17
The way we do this is by expanding the language that candidate systems
can be formulated in. As before [i.e., in standardHumeanism], systems can
use vocabulary that refers to perfectly natural properties (the properties
that make up the mosaic)—what we’ve called the “base language.” But in
addition to this they can introduce and use any other vocabulary so long
as it comes in uninterpreted.
How does such uninterpreted vocabulary come to have content? It can
have content if a system links the novel vocabulary to the base language;
that is, if the system contains sentences that contain both novel vocabulary
and the already interpreted vocabulary of the base language.18
We’ll see below some of the eects of this liberalisation.
For now, the important thing is to recognise that the whole strategy turns on the
following claim:
Core claim. B is the best systematisation of H .
15Callender, in particular, discusses this in detail.
16If the wavefunction Ψ did refer to anything in the basis, then we would instead be dealing with
something like the Albert/Loewer/Darby strategy.
17Albeit one which—as they observe—is pregured by [Lewis, 1994]’s discussion of chance, and
[Hall, 2009]’s discussion of mass and charge.
18[Bhogal and Perry, 2015, p. 5]
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I now argue that the Bohumeans have not given us any good reason to believe this
claim. It bears emphasising that the burden of proof should fall on those making this
claim to give us some reason to accept it. A good way to see this is to consider the
following view, which I’ll call “Bohkleyianism”. The Bohkleyan, like the Bohumean,
wants tomake quantummechanics consistent with an extremely austere fundamental
basis. In fact, the Bohkleyan holds that the only things which fundamentally exist are
her own phenomenological experiences. By adopting the Humean strategy, though,
she also claims that she can advocate Bohmian mechanics: by introducing new theo-
retical vocabulary (that of the wavefunctions and the particles), and linking it to her
phenomenological vocabulary. In other words, she maintains that the best systemati-
sation of her phenomenological experiences, P , is the system B of Bohmian mechan-
ics. The success of the Bohkleyan strategy will thus depend on the plausibility of the
following claim:
Core claim*. B is the best systematisation of P .
So, why should we be Bohumeans rather than Bohkleyans? Evidently, the funda-
mental ontology of Bohkleyianism is (by construction) more epistemically accessible
than that of Bohumeanism. And note that merely overcoming scepticism won’t be
enough to see o the Bohkleyan. After all, the Bohkleyan believes in the existence
of the external world, in just the same way that the Bohumean believes in the wave-
function: the external world supervenes upon the fundamental ontology of her inter-
nal phenomenological experiences, just as the Bohumean’s wavefunction supervenes
upon the fundamental ontology of particle trajectories. So if Bohumeans are not to be
Bohkleyans, then the reason can only be that they think Core claim is more plausible
than Core claim*. If so, then they surely owe us some account of why we ought to
believeCore claim, in a way that won’t extend toCore claim*. In other words, if we’re
allowed to just help ourselves to claims about what best systematises what, then we
may as well go the whole hog from Bohumeanism to Bohkleyanism.19
19cf. [Miller, 2014, p. 582], after discussing a very similar case: “she [the aspiring Bohumean] will seek
to place some principled limits on the BSA [best-systems-account] strategy and, in the light of the
availability of that strategy, to develop a distinction between her brand of realism and instrumen-
talism.”
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4 Defending the core claim
So, how is Core claim to be defended? The most explicit way to do so would be to
rst x some set of trajectories which is a plausible candidate to represent the ac-
tual evolution of the world; then determine some way of measuring the combined
simplicity-plus-strength, relative to those trajectories, of candidate “packages” of dif-
ferential equations andwavefunctions (or otherwavefunction-like things, appropriate
to dierential equations dierent from Bohmian mechanics); and then show that the
package consisting of the guidance equation, Schrödinger equation, and some univer-
sal wavefunction are maximal with respect to that measure.
This is an insanely dicult problem. First, we need to overcome the formidable
hurdles of nding an appropriate means of evaluating candidate packages. Second,
even given such ameans, it would be extraordinary if the project of nding some set of
trajectories for which a Bohmian package is indeed the best system proved to be even
remotely mathematically tractable. Third, it is rather opaque what would be involved
in showing that a given Bohmian distribution is “a plausible candidate to represent the
actual evolution of the world”; but given that at least a necessary condition would be
that the distribution contain an unbelievably large number of particles, the prospects
for doing so do not look good. In other words, if the Bohumean is going to convince
us that the basis H is best systematised by Bohmian mechanics, they aren’t going to
do so by direct computation.
In this regard, of course, they are in the same boat as standard Humeanism about
laws of nature. In general, Humeans have not sought to show directly that such-and-
such a theory is the best codication of such-and-such primitive categorical facts. (Al-
though it is worth noting that the direct computation is even less possible for the Bo-
humean than for the standard Humean, given that we’re now allowed to introduce
new theoretical vocabulary into the best system. This means that the available sys-
tems of equations to consider are not limited to just those equations employing only
a xed stock of variables and parameters (i.e., those ranging over the supervenience
basis); rather, we must consider any equations whose variables and parameters in-
clude that xed stock.) Instead, Humeans have usually taken the practice of science
itself to provide some reason for thinking that our actual scientic theories—or some
extension thereof—are plausible candidates for being the best systematisation of the
physical facts. Bhogal and Perry suggest such a response is appropriate to the case of
Bohumeanism as well:
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This worry, that mere positional facts wouldn’t be complicated enough
to distinguish something like Bohmian Mechanics as the best system of
that world, strikes us as far too pessimistic. One of the key motivating
thoughts behind the best system account is that whatever an ideal scien-
tist, if she was fully rational and knew everything about the state of the
mosaic, would take to be the best overall theory given the evidence is the
best system of that world.
Actual scientists are not ideal reasoners and they do not have access to the
entirety of the facts about themosaic. Of the elements of themosaic, actual
scientists only have direct access to facts about positions. [. . . ]
If we look to actual scientic practice, we see that physicists, even with ac-
cess to only a tiny slice of the position facts, have a great deal of condence
that theworld is quantummechanical (and consider this position verywell
conrmed). If this, in the grand scheme of things, meager set of position
facts is enough to satisfy non-ideal working scientists, then we see very
little reason to be skeptical that the ideal scientist, with access to all the po-
sition facts at our Bohmian world, would settle on a Bohmian Mechanical
physical theory.20
We might summarise this argument as follows:
1. Non-ideal actual scientists have empirical access to data comprising a small frag-
ment of the facts in the Humean supervenience basis.
2. Those scientists have come up with Bohmian mechanics as the best systematisa-
tion of that data.
C. Therefore, an ideal scientist, who had access to all the facts in the supervenience
basis, would come up with Bohmian mechanics as the best systematisation of
that full set of facts.
Unfortunately, however, both premises of this argument are false.
First, premise 1. The basic idea here is that, in Bell’s dictum, “all measurements are
measurements of position”; and so—on the viewof theworld advanced byBohmians—
any experimental data can be characterised in terms of the positions of the Bohmian
20[Bhogal and Perry, 2015, p. 18]
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particles. The problem is that our evidence for quantum mechanics is (famously) sta-
tistical in nature. It is not that we have direct access to some small number of the
Bohmian trajectories, and have successfully stitched those together by overlaying a
wavefunction governed by quantum dynamics. What we have instead are individual
but imprecise measurements of positions at particular times. By making many such
measurements of identically prepared systems, and looking at the frequency distribu-
tions of the results, we can obtain high conrmation of the probability densities over
such trajectories (on the Bohmian picture). So what we have really woven together
into a quantum tapestry are those probability densities, rather than the trajectories
themselves; and on the Bohmian’s own account, those probability densities represent all
that can ever be known for sure about the trajectories.
But suppose that scientists did in fact have access to the Bohmian trajectories. Even
then, premise 2 would be false: just as a matter of sociological fact, it is false that the
scientic community has alighted on Bohmian mechanics as the preferred theory for
explaining and systematising quantum phenomena. What they have in fact come up
with is “textbook” quantum mechanics: a messy, foundationally unclear, and yet in-
credibly empirically successful combination of systematic dynamics, particular mod-
els, and pragmatic rules for extracting empirical content. One might hold that this is
irrelevant, though, given the empirical equivalence between Bohmian mechanics and
textbook quantum mechanics:21 doesn’t that show that Bohmian mechanics and text-
book quantum mechanics are equally capable of systematising the relevant data, and
hence that it makes no odds (so far as the argument from scientic practice is con-
cerned) whether scientists have adopted one or the other? In other words, perhaps
premise 2 could be replaced by
2’ Those scientists could just as well have come up with Bohmian mechanics as the
best systematisation of that data.
Butwhether or not something is the best system is not invariant under empirical equiv-
alence. After all, textbook quantummechanics is empirically equivalent to the theory
consisting of all and only its observational predictions—but no-one is going to think
that that theory is a serious candidate for best system. So we cannot use the empiri-
cal equivalence of Bohmian and textbook quantum mechanics to argue that they are
equally well (or poorly) qualied to be best systems.
Alternatively, onemight just think it is obvious that no such hodge-podge as textbook
quantum mechanics could possibly be the best systematisation of the empirical data.
21My thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
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But that’s just a reason to think that the argument from scientic practice is not a good
argument: if it’s clearly false that textbook quantummechanics is the best system, then
that shows that actualworking scientists do not always converge upon the best system,
not that they have not convergedupon textbook quantummechanics. However, it does
suggest a third version of premise 2: perhaps what the argument really ought to have
said was
2” Those scientists should have come up with Bohmian mechanics as the best sys-
tematisation of that data.
One could defendpremise 2” as follows: from the fact that scientists have comeupwith
textbook quantum mechanics, infer that textbook quantum mechanics must be a very
good systematisation of the data; from its empirical equivalence to textbook quantum
mechanics, infer that Bohmianmechanics is at least as strong as textbook quantumme-
chanics; argue that Bohmian mechanics is simpler than textbook quantummechanics
(and than any of its rival solutions to the measurement problem);22 and nally, infer
that Bohmian mechanics is the best system, at least in the neighbourhood.
But this argument does not work either. First, we need to be a little careful about
the sense of empirical equivalence in play here. That empirical equivalence means
that over those situations where both theories apply, they will generate the same predic-
tions. However, at least as things currently stand, there are many situations to which
quantum mechanics, but not Bohmian mechanics, can be successfully applied. Most
notably, although it is an ongoing (and important) frontier of research,23 there is cur-
rently no Bohmian version of quantum eld theory capable of fully replicating the
standard formalism; that cuts o support from the predictive success of high energy
physics. Thus, Bohmian mechanics is less strong than textbook quantum mechanics.
Of course, this isn’t to say that this will always remain the case: extending the scope
and range of Bohmian analyses is an important and ongoing research project. The
point being made here is just that whilst that project is still ongoing, comparing the
two theories on strength will favour textbook quantum mechanics.
Second, even with regards to quantum systems that are in principle analysable in
Bohmian terms, there are plenty of examples where doing so is highly unnatural. The
standard means of analysing a quantum system involves characterising its dynamics
in terms of whatever degrees of freedom are most apt for the problem at hand; but
22Note that I’m assuming, here, that the best system is beingmeasured on a classic Lewisian simplicity-
and-strength kind of metric.
23See [Struyve, 2010] for a survey.
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calculating what the particles are up to requires always working in the position basis.
So even if a direct Bohmian analysis is in principle available, it may well fall beyond
any practical capacity of working physicists. This provides a reason to think that even
in those caseswhere Bohmianmechanics is as strong as textbook quantummechanics,
it may not be simpler—despite its greater conceptual clarity. (A more decisive judg-
ment, unfortunately, would only be possible with more details about how judgments
of simplicity are to be made; without that, it’s unclear how to trade o mathematical
tractability against conceptual or foundational rigour.)
The above points are, of course, familiar from the debates over the measurement
problem. So perhaps the defence of premise 2” is simply that the Bohumean was
making a conditional claim: if Bohmianmechanics is the best solution to themeasure-
ment problem, then the threat to Humean Supervenience can be thwarted. Premise 2”
would then appear to simply follow from the assumption that the criteria of simplicity
and strength that judge the best system are also those which would be used to judge
the best solution to themeasurement problem. (Provided, that is, thatwe put aside the
concerns I raised above and identify our experimental data—i.e., the stu that is grist
to the mill of the measurement problem—with the data about Bohmian trajectories.)
However, this appearance is deceptive. The problem is that in premise 2”, we need
to understand “Bohmian mechanics” to mean “the formalism of Bohmian mechanics,
plus a specication of the actual wavefunction” (or rather, a specication of the actual
wavefunction at a given time—for brevity, I’ll just say “specication of the wavefunc-
tion”). In supposing that Bohmian mechanics is the best solution to the measurement
problem, we would be understanding “Bohmian mechanics” to mean just “the for-
malism of Bohmian mechanics”. The advocate of Bohmian mechanics as a solution to
the measurement problem will take it that there is somewavefunction that is most apt
for describing the world—but the point is that insofar as they are merely a Bohmian
rather than a Bohumean, the “system” that they put forward need not contain any
specic claims about what the universal wavefunction is actually like. So, even sup-
posing that Bohmian mechanics is the best solution to the measurement problem, it
doesn’t follow that Bohmian mechanics together with a specic wavefunction is the
best systematisation of the trajectories: the latter is far, far less simple than the former
(consider how much harder it would be to t it on a T-shirt).24
Of course, specifying a wavefunction will give much more information about what
the trajectories are going to do, i.e., will generate a stronger system. Perhaps, with the
24The “T-shirt test” for simplicity is borrowed from David Albert.
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right way of balancing simplicity against strength, the former factor will win out and
the facts about the wavefunction get counted as part of the best system. In that case,
however, a dierent problem rears its head. If the gains in strength from specifying
the wavefunction could be paid for in the coin of simplicity, why would the same not
be true of specifying the (initial) positions of the particles? After all, much less data
is involved in specifying where the particles are than in specifying what the wave-
function is up to: the former is just 3N real numbers, rather than uncountably many
complex numbers (one for every point of space). But the gains from this extra data
are enormous, since (together with the wavefunction) one obtains a perfect prediction
of everything to happen at every moment. That would then, ad absurdum, make the
initial conditions a lawlike matter.25 So the Bohumean faces a dilemma, neither horn
of which is palatable. If their rules for assessing the best system do not give strength
enough weight, then they cannot make it plausible that a direct specication of the
wavefunction (at a time) will be included. And if their rules do give strength enough
weight to avoid this, then they cannot make it plausible that a direct specication of
the particle positions (at a time) will be excluded.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, let’s take a brief step back, and think about how Bohumeanism compares
to Humeanism about classical physics. The reason the problems in the previous sec-
tion arise is that the Bohumean is, in one crucial respect, worse o than her classical
cousin: the latter could, at least, identify the kind of structure in the supervenience ba-
sis (i.e., intrinsic properties of points or pointlike things) with the experimental data
that (idealised) science collects, and hence argue that the vast parallel-processor of
the scientic enterprise has in fact systematised that data into an optimally simple
and strong codication. By doing so, the classical Humean can relieve some of the
pressure to make precise the nature of the best systematisation they envisage, or to
show that such a thing is even possible, since science itself could be taken as demon-
strating a proof of principle. The experimental basis for quantum mechanics, on the
other hand, is a poor t with the supervenience basis of the Bohumean. On the one
hand, it is too big: it covers many more situations than those to which Bohmian me-
chanics (at its current state of development) is readily applied. On the other, it is too
small: the proposed supervenience basis (even over some local region) goes far be-
25cf. [Hall, 2009, §5.6]
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yond what could be gathered by empirical investigation (even in principle). Without
this tight t between the supervenience basis and the empirical basis, I don’t see how
empirical practice can be a source of optimism that Bohmianmechanics is, indeed, the
best systematisation of the supervenience basis.
But this prompts a further question. Classically, a signicant component of the mo-
tivation for Humean Supervenience has been taken to be epistemic: since what we have
direct epistemic access to (the thought goes) are facts about intrinsic properties of in-
dividual spacetime points or pointlike entities, we should seek ametaphysics founded
upon those facts. (This isn’t to claim that Humeans are committed to this claim about
the nature of scientic evidence; it’s just that without such a claim, it’s not obvious
what the advantage is of insisting that all physical facts be local facts.) Now, one can
certainly criticise this move, from a premise about what is epistemically available to
a conclusion about what is metaphysically acceptable.26 If, though, the practice of
quantum physics does not help the Humean, then we should start to question the an-
tecedent claim too. After all, we do in fact perform entanglement experiments, which
(at least on some interpretations of quantummechanics) constitute the observation of
non-Humean facts! So what is going on?
The answer, I contend, is that although individual observations are indeed (some-
what) localised, it just does not follow that those observations cannot provide infor-
mation about or evidence for irreducibly global goings-on. Prima facie, at least, the
way in which one does so is about the simplest imaginable: we simply make multi-
ple local observations, and then aggregate those observations. Suppose, for example,
that mass was not locally conserved, but was conserved on some larger scale—let’s
say, on the scale of the Earth. It is straightforwardly possible to accumulate evidence
for this hypothesis, by making continuous observations at dierent points of space,
and then comparing the results. Mass disappears here, we nd; but we then nd that
just the same quantity reappeared elsewhere, at exactly the same time. Obviously, no
one observer could simultaneously verify the reappearance and the disappearance of
the mass. But that’s not a problem, given that they can write down their results and
compare them, at a later date, with other observers. And clearly, this kind of pro-
cess is somewhat more involved than the experimental processes needed to conrm
or disconrm a purely local phenomenon—and were the non-local phenomena more
widespread (either covering a larger, or concerning more kinds of phenomena), then
it might well move beyond our capacities to verify it. But less pervasive non-locality
26See [Maudlin, 2007] for a particularly biting critique.
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seems like something well within our conrmatory capacities.
The point of this little parable, of course, is that it’s more or less exactly what we do
to verify the non-local aspects of quantum mechanics:27 we make simultaneous local
measurements in multiple locations, and then bring the results together to compare
them. So the simplistic picture of scientic evidence that seemingly motivates the
doctrine of Humean Supervenience is long due retirement—andwith it, the insistence
that our best scientic theories be made to t that doctrine, at whatever price.
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